When consumers aren’t happy with the services they receive, they typically have the option to move to a competitor who can better meet their needs. But shippers who rely solely on rail to get their goods from one destination to the next may not be so fortunate. In this context, “captive shippers” are those who must depend upon a single railway — and may have little recourse if rail service isn’t up to snuff.
That’s why many are eager to see if a new reciprocal switching proposal from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) may finally spell some relief.
What is reciprocal switching?
In our post on this topic last year, we cited a Railway Age resource in which author Frank N. Wilner defined reciprocal switching as the “means that a railroad with sole physical access to a shipper facility transfers shipper freight cars to a near-by junction point with a second competing railroad. The second railroad pays a compensatory per-car switching fee.”
He also noted that reciprocal switching is nothing new, since railroads “have long voluntarily switched cars on behalf of each other where they find it economically justified.” But he said “involuntary” reciprocal switching was another matter.
FreightWaves’ Joanna March said reciprocal shipping occurs “when a shipper has access to one freight railroad but wants access to a nearby competing freight railroad in order to cultivate a competitive pricing environment,” noting that proponents underscore its benefits for captive shippers.
STB’s March 2022 public hearing on reciprocal switching
STB proposes new reciprocal switching rule
Service Reliability
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“One proposed approach would be to set the success rate during the first year after the rule’s effective date at 60%, meaning that at least 60% of shipments arrive within 24 hours of the OETA, and increasing the success rate thereafter to 70%.”
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“The Board also seeks comment on other approaches, such as maintaining the required success rate at 60% permanently or raising it to higher than 70% after the second year.”
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“The Board notes that by phasing in a higher success rate over time it would be providing the Class I carriers with time to increase their work forces and other resources, or to modify their operations, as necessary, in order to meet the required performance standard.”
Service Consistency
Inadequate Local Service
Additional key factors
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A requirement that “all Class I carriers…provide their customers with the historical data for these service metrics within seven days of a customer’s request” so rail customers can determine whether their rail service providers are meeting the standards
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A provision for “affirmative defenses for service failures resulting from issues beyond the rail carrier’s control, such as natural disasters or actions of third parties”
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A first-time requirement that “all three service metrics be standardized across all Class I carriers”
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A proposal to “make permanent certain data reporting requirements relevant to service reliability and inadequate local service currently being collected on a temporary basis in other dockets”
“The Board proposes that the reciprocal switching agreements would be for a minimum period of two years and up to a maximum of four years, depending on the evidence presented, though the Board seeks comment on whether a longer period is necessary to ensure the rule’s effectiveness,” the STB says. “The reciprocal switching agreement could be terminated at the end of the prescribed period if the incumbent rail carrier proves to the Board that it can provide service meeting the pertinent minimum standard going forward. If it fails to do so, the reciprocal switching agreement would remain in place.”
Chairman Oberman issued a comprehensive statement that helps to describe the “why” behind the new NPRM, which is available in the STB announcement.
Comments on the NPRM are due by October 23, 2023, and reply comments are due by November 21, 2023.